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[L. A. No. 25550.

In Bank.

July 26, 1961.]

TRANQUILLA VAl, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BANK OF
AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, as Coexecutor and Trustee, etc., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
[1] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Management and
Control.-Because of his management and control over the
community property, the husband occupies the position of
trustee for his wife in respect to her half interest in the comllIunity assets; this position of trust is not terminated as to
assets remaining in his hands when the spouses separate. It
is part of his fiduciary duties to account to her for the community property when the spouses are negotiating a property
settlement agreement.
£2] Id.-Community Property-Management and Control.-Divorce
proceedings do not in themselves interrupt the husband's
powers with respect to management and control of communit.y
property, since the effect of such proceedings is not to take
the property into the court's custody.

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 64; Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 50.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5, 7, 11, 16] Husband and Wife,
§ 100; [2, 3] Husband and Wife, § 101; [6, 8-10] Trusts, § 10;
[12-14] Partnership, § 36; [15] Partnership, § 37: [17] Husband
and Wife, §l65; [18, 21] Husband and Wife, § 189(3); [19, 20]
Limitation of Actions, § 61(0); [22] Husband and Wife, § 189(2).
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[3] Id.-Oommunity Property-Management and OontroL-When
a divorce is pending, the power of a husband over the community property erists until entry of a flnal decree.
r4] Id.-Oommunity Property-Management and Oontrol.-Since a
husband's eontrol of the community property continues until
there has been a division of it by agreement or court decree,
. the husband would remain a fiduciary in respect to his wife's
interest in the community assets until such division was made,
though she may choose not to rely on her husband and release
him from his fiduciary duties.
[5] Id.-Oommunity Property-Management and Oontrol.-The
fiduciary relationship based on the husballd's position of
trustee for his wife in respect to her interest in community
property arises by virtue of the community property system
which gives the husband management and control of such property in order that the assets be more efficiently handled, and
exists only as to the community property over which he has
control. It should be distinguished from the confidential relationship which is presumed to exist between spouses.
r6] Trusts-Existence of Confidential Relationship.-A confidential
relation exists between two persons when one has gained the
confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the
other's interest in mind. It may exist although there is DO
fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely to exist where there
is a family relationship or one of friendship or such a relation
of confidence as that which arises between physician and
patient or priest and penitent.
r7] Husband and Wife-Oommunity Property-Management aDd
ControL-The confidential relationship and obligations arising
out of the relation of husband and wife are dependent on the
existence of confidence and trust, but the husband's fiduciary
duties in respect to his wife's interest in the community property continue as long as his control of that property continues,
notwithstanding complete nbsence of confidence and trust and
consequent termination of the confidential rJlationsbip.
[8] '!'rusts - Oonfidential Relationship - Fiducial')' Relationship
Distinguished.-The prerequisite of a confidential relationship
is the reposing of trust and confidence by one person in another
who is cognizant of this fact. The key factor in the existence
of a fiduciary relationship lies in control by a person over the
property of another.
[9] Id.-Existence of Confidential and Fiducial')' RelatioDships.-··
While confidential and fiduciary relationships may exist simultimeously, they do not necessarily do so.
[10] Id.-Existence of Confidential and Fiduciary Relationships.Though a confidential relationship may be terminated by either
party, if an individual continues to control property of the

)
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other he is held to the duties of a fiduciary as long ae he retains
such control, notwithstanding termination of the confidential
relationship.
flla, lIb] Husband and Wife - Community Property - Management and ControI.-The position of a husband, in whom the
management and control of the entire community estate is
vested by Civ. Code, §§ 161a, 172, 172a, is frequently analogized to that of a partner, agent or fiduciary. The fiduciary
duties and rules governing their performance by a husband
should be no fewer or less rigorous than those imposed on business partners.
[12] Partnership-Relations Between Partners-Fiduciary Relation.-In all proceedings connected with the conduct of a partnership every partner is bound to act in the highest good
faith to his copartner anI! mny not obtain any advantage over
him in the p:U'tnel'ship affairs by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of any kind. (Civ.
Cou<', ~§ 2410, 2411.)

[13] ld. - Relations Between Partners - Fiduciary Relation. - In
view of the nature of the relation, the necessity of exercising
the highest good faith in it is especially marked between a managing partner and his copartners, and proof that one has
waived his rights against the other must be clear.
[14] ld. - Relations Between Partners - Fiduciary Relation. - In
the course of negotiations for dissolution, each partner must
deal fairly with his copartners and not conceal from them
important matters within his own knowledge touching the business and property of the partnership.
[15] ld.-Relations Between Partners-Fiduciary Belation.-One
partner, in negotiating for the purchase of his copartner's interest in the partnership, owes the latter the duty of fair play
and full disclosure, but once the sale is consummated, the
relationship between them immediately ceases and the purchaser is justified in dealing thereafter with the other at
arm's length.
[16] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Management and
Control.-The fact that a wife employs able counsel on whom
she relies in negotiating a property settlement agreement in
conjunction with her action for separate maintenance does not
release the husband from any fiduciary duties in respect to her
interest in the community property.
[17] ld. - Transactions Inter Se - Fraud. - A husband's failure,
while negotiating a property settlement agreement with his
[17] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, §§ 64, 77; Am.Jur.,
Husbano a11(1 Wife, § 184.
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wife pending her action for separate maintenance, to disclose
fully and fairly material facts relating to the value of community assets, from which he gained an advantage, constituted
a concealment of material facts and a breach of fiduciary duty
with respect to his wife's interest in the community property
Under his control and management. This was constnletive
fraud, whether or not such failure to disclose was accompanied
by actual intent to defraud. (Civ. Code, §§ 2235, 1573, subds.
1,2.)
nS] Id.-Actions-Defenses-Laches.-In an action to rescind a
property settlement agreement on the ground of fraud, in
determining whether there was unreasonable delay in commencing the action, the proper guide was the statute of limitations stating that an action for relief on the ground of fraud
must be commenced within three years, but that the cause
of action is not deemed to have accrued until discovery, by
the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud. (Code
Civ. Proe., § 338, subd. 4.)
[19] Limitation of Actions - Fraud - Discovery - Knowledge of
Facts.-Discovery is different from knowledge, so that where
a party defrauded has received information of facts which
should put him on inquiry and the inquiry, if made, would
disclose the fraud, he will be charged with discovery as of
the time the inquiry would have given him knowledge•.
[20] Id.-Fraud-Discovery-Knowledge of Facts.-In order that
means of knowledge shall charge plaintiff or the party defrauded with knowledge or notice, the circumstances must be
such that inquiry becomes a duty and failure to make it a negligent omission; when no duty is imposed by law to make inquiry and where under the circumstances a prudent man would
not be put on inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge
are open to plaintiff and he has not availed himself of them
does not debar him from relief when thereafter he shall make
actual discovery.
[21] Husband and Wife - Actions - Defenses - Laches. - In an
action by a widow to rescind a property settlement agreement
on the ground of fraud, assuming that plaintiff, who did not
actually know of the fraud before her husband's death, could
have discovered the fraud had she investigated, where no circumstances were shown which should have put plaintiff on inquiry until after her husband's death when she was told that
she had not been treated fairly by her husband, there was no
unreasonahlc delny in instituting the action shortly after his
death, though it was instituted more than three years after
the agreement was signed.
[19] See Oal.Jur.2d, I,imitation of Actions, § 55; Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 169.
.
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[22] Id.-Actions-Defenses-Estoppel.-In an action by a widow
to rescind a property settlement agreement, plaintifi' was not
estopped and precluded from rescission by a stipulation in the
agreement that it was entered into freely and voluntarily
without promises or representations not contained therein,
where none of its provisions had any legal or binding effect
because the agreement itself was procured by fraud.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. William J. Palmer, Judge. Reversed.
Action by a widow to rescind a property settlement agreement on ground of deceased husband's fraud, and for recovery
of part of property received by husband or for damages.
Judgment for defendants reversed.
Martin & Camusi, William P. Camusi and Kenneth D.
Holland for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Appel, Liebermann & Leonard and Boekel, Moran & Morris
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
George M. Breslin, Michael G. Luddy, Henry G. Bodkin, Jr.,
E. E. Hitchcock, Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & Rindge, Samuel
H. Rindge, Wallace & Wallace, W. Woodson Wallace and
Alden Reid for Defendants and Respondents.
WHITE, J.-This is an appeal by Tranqnilla Vai from a
judgment for defendant Bank ofA.merica as coexecutor with
Henry Bodkin of the estate of Giovanni Vai, deceased, in a
suit brought to rescind a property settlement agreement on
the ground of fraud, for recovery of part of the property
received by the hnsband under the agreement, and for damages
in the event recovery thereof cannot be had.
Plaintiff and Giovanni (John) Vai were married in Italy
in 1907 and emigrated to this conntry and Los Angeles in
1912. John joined his brother James in operating a winery.
He remained in this business and related operations continuously from 1912 until his death in February 1957, and plaintiff actively assisted him until their only child Madeline was
born in 1925. Their daughter is mentally arrested and has
required constant care and attention. Apparently the relations between plaintiff and her husband had been something
less than harmonious for several years before January 1953,
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when she left their home in Alta Loma and moved to another
residence they owned in Parkside, where she has since resided.
She consulted with counsel, Mr. Hallam Mathews, on Janu. ary 7, 1953. After plaintiff gave him a list of the property in
which she believed John had an interest, Mr. Mathews secured
a Dun and Bradstreet report on Padre Vineyard Company,
owned jointly by John and his brother, and a combined report
on Cucamonga Valley Winc Company and Rancho El Camino,
John's individual businesses. Mr. Mathews also secured descriptions of real property in San Bernardino County and a
description of the Parkside property, consisting of a 30-yearold residence with 15 apartments.
On February 6, 1953, plaintiff filed a separate maintenance
action, and John was served with a "Subpoena In Re Deposition and Order to Show Cause for Support, etc. Pendente
Lite." John and his attorney represented, and the trial court
so found, that John's health was such that adversary proceedings would be highly detrimental; that it would not be
necessary for Mr. Mathews to pursue his legal remedies of
discovery; that plaintiff would be voluntarily supplied with
full and complete information; and that John would negotiate
a fair and equitable property settlement agreemcnt. No
further independent investigation was made by plaintiff
except for an appraisal of the Parkside property which she
was to receive in the property settlement agreement. Following execution of this agreement, on March 16, 1953, the action
for separate maintenance was abandoned. The present. action
was instituted shortly after John's death.
The property settlement agreement provided that plaintiff
should have one-half of any property later discovered to
have been inadvertently omitted from the list of community
assets. Pursuant to this clause, the trial court awarded her a
total of $84,000 as her share of the following items of "afterdiscovered" property: 95 shares of common stock of the Bank
of America, together with all dividends paid thereon sinee
March 16, 1953, amount.ing to $897.75; a promissory note in
the principal sum of $33,640 with $1,462.55 interest; an account payable to Giovanni Yai. from Paclre Vineyard Company, in the sum of $23,000; the balance owing on a promissory note of Padre Vineyard Company in favor of Giovanni
Vai in the sum of $25,630.44; the balance owing on two notes
of Padre Vineyard Company to Giovanni Vai, doing business
as the Cucamonga Valley Wine Company in the sum of
$42,315.38.
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The trial court found that the net worth of John and
Tranquilla Vai at the time of the settlement was $1,270,000,
not including one-half the shares of Padre, net book value of
which was $800,000. All of the property was conceded by the
parties to be community. There were debts for which the
community was liable of $85,000. In the settlement, plaintiff
received the Parkside property, valued at $150,000, $25,000 in
cash, a Dodge automobile, $1,204 balance in an account ill
the Bank of America, and half of the Italian lire on deposit
in Italy (about $1,000). She was released from any obligation
to support the daughter, Madeline, and from any possible liability as coguarantor with her husband on a note securing a
debt from Padre Vineyards to the Bank of America. Although
she waived alimony, she was guaranteed a net income of $500
per month from Parkside, which defendant agreed to keep in
repair as long as she owned it. John received the balance
of the property which was, it now appears, valued at least at
$1,500,000.
The complaint initiating this suit to rescind the property
settlement agreement charged that in the negotiation of the
property settlement, John Vai was guilty of actual fraud, consisting of allegedly false representations and intentional concealment of material facts, by which the plaintiff was deceived
and defrauded. It also charged constructive fraud, consisting
of breach of John Vai's duty as a fiduciary to make a free
and full disclosure of all important and relevant facts. The
trial court ruled that John was not a fiduciary, that the parties
dealt at arm's lenuth, that there was no iss'lle of constructive
fraud and that there. was no proof of actual fraud.
Plaintiff contends that although the confidential relationship between herself and her husband, based on her confidence
and trust in him, may have been terminated by her filing suit
for separate maintenance, her husband remained in a fiduciary
position in respect to her interest in the community property.
He breached his fiduciary duty, she asserts, by concealing
material facts and by falsely representing others.
Defendants l'ontend that Collim v. Collins, 48 Ca1.2d 325
[309 P.2d 420], is directly applicable to the facts at bar as
found by the trial court. In Collins, the wife sought recision
of a property settlement agreement on the ground that her
husband had concealed community property assets from her
and thus breached his duty of full disclosure arising out of the
confidential relationship. Her attorney in Nevada where she

)

)
/

336

V AI

1).

BANE: OF AMERICA

[56 C.2d

had gone to establish residence for divorce, requested the
defendant husband to furnish them with a full and accurate
list of community property. This request was never complied
with. Mrs. Collins returned to California and signed an agreement prepared by defendant's attorney, and against the advice
of her own counsel. Some properties standing in defendant's
.llame were not listed ill the agreement, but no attempt had
been made by the defendant to conceal these properties which
he claimed to be his separate property, or to hinder in any
wayan investigation begun by Mrs. Collins and her attorney.
Manifestly, Mrs. Collins was fully aware that her husband
had not disclosed any information about their community
property, and expressly waived any such disclosure in writing
when she executed the agreement. She knowingly chose to
deal at arm's length and to rely on her own investigation of
community assets. Thus by her own act, Mrs. Collins terminated the fiduciary relationship in respect to her interest in
the community property and the attendant duty to disclose.
Plaintiff in the instant case discontinued the adversary proceedings commenced by her at the request of the defendant
who offered to supply full and complete information concern- .
ing the property all of which was conceded to be community,
and who further stated that he was willing to negotiate a
fair and equitable property settlement. It would seem that
plaintiff chose not to terminate the fiduciary relationship nor
to deal at arm's length, but instead to take the defendant'a
offer at face value. She signed the agreement believing that
she was fully and accurately informed as to the Vai community
financial position.
Manifestly, therefore, the facts in Collins, supra, are
markedly dissimilar from those in the instant case except
insofar as both wives were represented by counsel who commenced investigations.
Section 161a (Civ. Code) provides: "The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during
continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing and
equal interests under the management and controi of the
husband as is provided in sections 172 and 172a. . . . This
section shall be construed as defining the respective interests
and rights of husband and wife in the community property."1
'Civil Code, t 172: "The husband has the management and control
of the community personal property. • . ." Civil Code, t 172a: "The
husband has the management and control of the community real property.••• "

)
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[1] Because of his management and control over the community property, the husband occupies the position of trustee
for his wife in respect to her one-half interest in the communityassets. (Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal.App.2d 443, 447-448
l~05 P.2d 402].) Recognizing this principle, Justice Traynor,
speaking for a unanimous court, stated in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal.2d 13, 21 [193 P.2d 728], "As the manager of the
community property the husband occupies a position of trust
(Civ. Code, §§ 172-173, 158), which is not terminated as to
assets remaining in his hands when the spouses separate. It
is part of his fiduciary duties to account to the wife for the
community property when the spouses are negotiating a property settlement agreement."
[2] "Even divorce proceedings pending do not, in themselves, interrupt the husband 's powers with respect to the
management and control of community property, as the e1feet
of such proceedings is not to take the property into the custody of the court. The husband continues to have control of
it and full power to dispose of it." (Chance v. Kobsted, 66
Cal.App. 434, 437 [226 P. 632].) [3] "When a divorce is
pending the power of a husband over the community property
exists until the entry of a final decree. (Lord v. Hough, 43
Cal. 581; Chance v. Kobsied, 66 Cal.App. 434, 437 [226 P.
632] ; In re Cummings, 84 F.Supp. 65, 69.)" (Harrold v.
Harrold,43 Cal.2d 77, 81 [271 P.2d 489].)
[ 4] Since the husband's control of the community property continues until there has been a division of it by agreement or by court decree, it would follow that the husband
would continue to remain a fiduciary in respect to his wife's
interest in the community assets until such division was made.
Of course, as wa.c; the case in Collins v. Collins, 48 Cal.2d 325
[309 P.2d 420], the wife may choose not to rely on her husband
and release him from the performance of his fiduciary duties.
[ 15 ] This fiduciary rellltionship arises by virtue of the
community property system which gives the husband management and control of such property in order that the assets be
more efficiently handled, and exists only as to the community
property over which the husband has control. It should be
distinguished from the confidential relationship which is presumed to exist behveen spouses. [6] "A confidential relation exists between two persons when one has gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the
other's interest in mind. A confidential relation may exist

)
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although there is no fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely
to exist where there is a family relationship or one of friendship or such a relation of confidence as that which arises between physician and patient or priest and penitent." (Rest.,
Trusts 2d, § 2, comment b.)
[7] The confidential relationship and obligations arising
, out of it are, therefore, dependent upon the existence of confidence and trust, but the husband's fiduciary duties in respect to his wife's interest in the community property continue as long as his control of that property continues, notwithstanding the complete absence of confidence and trust,
and the consequent termination of the confidential relationship.
[8] The prercquisite of a confidential relationship is the
reposing of trust and confidence by one person in another who
is cognizant of this fact. The key factor in the existence of a
fiduciary relationship lies in control by a person over the
property of another. [9] It is evident that while these two
relationships may exist simultaneously, they do not necessarily
do so. For example, in Estate of Cover~ 188 Cal. 133 [204
P. 583], where all of the property under the husband's control
was his separate property, only a confidential relation existed.
As this court there pointed out at page 144, the husband in
contracting with his wife concerning his separate property,
may choose either to advise his wife with her welfare in mind
or to "deal with her at arm's length and as he would with a
stranger, all the while giving her the opportunity of independent advice as to her rights in the premises."
The simultaneous existence of a confidential 'relationship
based on trust and confidence and a fiduciary relationship
arising out of control of property of another is readily apparent in many common associations-principal and agent,
attorney and client, business partners, to name a few. [10] It
is evident that although the confidential relationship may be
terminated by either party, if an individual continues to
control property of the other he is held to the duties of a
fiduciary as long as he retains such control, notwithstanding
the termination of the confidential relationship.
[11&] As noted ill Fields v. Miclia,cl, S11pra (91 Cal.App.2d
443,447), "The position of the husband, in whom the management and control of the entire community estate is vested by
statute (Civ. Code, §§ 161a, 172, 172a), has been frequently
analogized to that of a partner, agent or fiduciary. (Estate
of McNutt, 36 Cal.App.2d 542, 552 [98 P.2d 253] ; GroZemuM
v. Cafferata, 17 Ca1.2d 679, 684 [111 P.2d 641]; LyMm v.
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Vorwerk, 13 Cal.App. 507, 509 [110 P. 355]; 1 de Funiak,
Principles of Community Property, § 95, p. 263.)"
The dissolution of a partnership and attendant agree. ments respecting partnership property appear to be remarkably similar to the dissolution of the conjugal relation
. and property settlement agreements. [12] Briefly, "in
an proceedings connected with the conduct of the partnership
every partner is bound to act in the highest good faith to his
copartner and may not obtain any advantage over him in the
partnership affairs by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of any kind {Civ. Code,
§§2410,2411)." (Llewelyn v. Levi, 157 Cal. 31, 37 [106
P. 219], quoted in Yeomans v. Lysfjord, 162 Cal.App.2d 357,
361-362 [327 P.2d 957], and Prince v. Harting, 177 Cal.App.2d
720, 727 [2 Ca1.Rptr. 545].) [13] In view of the nature
of the relation, the necessity of exercising the highest good
faith in it is especially marked between a managing partner
and his copartners, and proof that one has waived his rights
against the other must be clear. (Lal/an v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 662,
679 [70 Am.Dec. 678], Burrow v. Carley, 210 Cal. 95, 105
[290 P. 577].) [14] In the course of negotiations for dissolution, each partner must deal fairly with his copartners and
not conceal from them import.ant matters within his own knowledge touching the business and property of the partnership.
(Arnold v. Arnold, 137 Cal. 291,296 [70 P. 23].) [15] Thus,
one partner, in negotiating for the purchase of his copartner's
interest in the partnership owes the latter the duty of fair
play and full disclosure, but. once the sale is consummated, the
relationship between them immediately ceases and the purchaser is justified in dealing thereafter with the other at
arm's length. (Wise &alty Co. v. Stewart, 169 Cal. 176 [146
P. 534]; 120 A..L.R. 724.)
[11 b] Manifestly, the fiduciary duties and rules governing
their performance by a husband should be no fewer or less
rigorous than those imposed upon business partners. [16] To
hold, as defendant urges, that if a wife employs able counsel
upon whom she relies in negotiating a property settlement
agreement ·in conjunction with her action for separate maintenance, that her husband is thereby released from any fiduciary
duties in respect to her interest in the community property,
would put a wife in a far less protected position than a
partner whose partnership is being dissolved. It would
U permit the authority of the husband in controlling the com-
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munity property, given him in the interest of greater freedom
in its use and for its transfer for the benefit of both himself
and his wife, to become a weapon to be used by him to rob her
of every vestige of interest in the community property with
which the law has expressly invested her. Such a conclusion
would violate every sense of justice, and outrage every principle of fair dealing known to the law." (Provost v. Provost,
102 Cal.App. 775, 781 [283 P. 842].)
Plaintiff alleges that due to misrepresentations and concealments by the defendant, she was not informed as to
the actual value of the community property and that she
would not have executed the property settlement agreement
in question had she been accurately and fully informed.
Specifically, plaintiff contends that the value of Rancho El
Camino was misrepresented and concealed. The following findings in respect to Rancho El Camino were made by the trial
court. :Mr. :Mathews, plaintiff's counsel, was shown a financial
statement prepared by John showing the book value of the
vineyard land at Rancho EI Camino to be $200 per acre.
Plaintiff '5 counsel was told of other vineyard land which sold
for $400 to $450 an acre but that such land was closer to
factories. He was not told of the price received by John ($566
per acre) for vineyard land immediately to the north o!'
Rancho EI Camino sold nine months previously. The trial
court found that Mr. Mathews (plaintiff's attorney) was
told that Rancho EI Camino was of little market value as a
vineyard and could hardly be sold when the wine market was
depressed. However, on February 21, 1953, 23 days prior to
the execution of the property settlement agreement, Jolm Vai
executed a sale deposit receipt for $25,000 with Donald Duncan, for the sale of Rancho El Camino, at a price of $525,000,
or $814 an acre. Plaintiff was never informed of this fact.
Escrow was opened four days after execution of the property
settlement agreement with plaintiff, and the property duly
sold to Duncan.
As additional breaches of John's fiduciary duty, plaintiff
draws our attention to representations relating to the financial
condition of Padre Vineyard which were made by John to
his wife and her attorney. When consideration is given to
representations found by the trial court to have been made to
plaintiff and comparison is had with other findings as to the
verity of such representations, it is readily apparent that
many representations were either not true or at least only
partially true. For instance, to cite a few: (1) Representation:
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Little would be realized if Padre were liquidated. Finding:
Padre's assets at the time of the execution of the property
settlement agreement exceeded its liabilities by approJOimately
one milliou dollars; it's net book value was in excess of
$800,000. (2) Representation: Padre was in danger of insolvency. Finding: It was not in danger of immediate insolvency, but if its operations continued to lose mOl1('y as it
llad ill the past, R danger of insolvency existed. (3) Representation: Salaries due to John and his brother as officers of
Padre had not been paid. Finding: Salaries of $300 to $500
a month had been and were currently being paid. (4) Representation: Padre owed John $80,000 to $90,000 and could not
meet its obligations. Finding: Various payments, including
$2,500 per month, on indebtedness owing to John had been
made by Padre during the months previous to the execution
of the property settlement agreement. (5) Representation:
A grave danger existed that Mrs. Vai and John would be
held liable on a continuing guaranty of Padre's liabilities
up to $300,000 to the Bank of America. Finding: The indebtedness to the Bank was secured by the hypothecation of assets
worth $],320,729 including only a part of the wine inventory
which could have been sold on the market for $435,000.
A transaction which took place in September, 1954 is indicative of the actual worth of John's one-half interest in this
(Padre) company which was "in danger of insolvency."
Padre orgRnized a new corporation called Padre Holding
Company, and later Alta Lorna Development Corporation.
John, in a split-off procedure, becRme the sole owner of this
corporation in exchange for his Padre stock. At that time,
the holding company had a net worth of $471,500 and no
liabilities. By June 30, 1955, over $300,000 of its assct., were
in cash.
As heretofore stared, the trial court found that the 11et
community worth at the time the agreement was signed was
$1,270,000 exclusive of one half of the Padre stock which John
and plaintiff owned. The net book value was $800,000. Roma
Wine had offered to buy the Padre company for $850,000
cash, assuming the liabilities, and as previously noted, John
received stock valued at over $400,000 in the split-off procedure
noted above. So, although the trial court felt. that the stock
in Padre had no determinable fair market value, a valuation
of $400,000 on the community interest in Padre as of March
1953 would not bc excessive. This brings the net community
worth up to $1,670,000. The trial court found that the obliga-
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tion undertaken by John in the property settlement agreement
to support Madeline for the rest of her life .had a value as
of March 16, 1953, of between $516,000 to $615,000. Even
if this entire sum is deducted from the total community assets,
.there remained over $1,000,000. It is obvious that the division
of the marital property under the instant agreement is an
inequitable one, and one to which neither plaintiff nor her
attorney would, as they contend, have agreed had tbey been
fully informed by John Vai as to the value of the community
assets.
Numerous other contentions relating to the existence of
actual fraud are made by plaintiff, many of which appear to
have merit. It docs not seem necessary to discuss them, however, in view of our holding contrary to that of the trial court
that a husband is under a fiduciary duty with respect to his
wife's interest in the community property.under his control
and management. [17] The failure of the husband in the
instant case to disclose fully and fairly material facts relating to the value of community assets from which John gained
an advailtage constitutes a concealment of material facts and
a breach of this fiduciary duty. This is constructive fraud,
whether or not such failure to disclose was accompanied by an
actual intent to defraud. (Civ. Code, §§ 2235, 1573, subds. 1
and 2.)
We are persuaded that the trial court misapplied the law
and erred in holding that no fiduciary relationship existed
during the negotiations leading up to the execution of the
property settlement agreement. The facts as found by the
trial court show the existence of a fiduciary relationship and
constructive fraud as a matter of law.
As to the failure of the now decedent husband to disclose
fully and fairly and the concealment on his part of material
facts with regard to the value of assets of the community, we
are satisfied from a reading of the record that this deception
was not only practiced upon the plaintiff wife but upon Mr.
Vai's attorney, Henry G. Bodkin, Sr., as well. At the trial
of the instant proceeding, the latter testified that at the time
the property settlement agreement was negotiated, his client,
Mr. Vai, did not advise Attorney Bodkin, Sr., nor did the
latter have any knowledge of the" after-discovered" property
hereinbefore referred to, the wife's share of which amounted
to $84,000. Attorney Bodkin, Sr. further testified that at no
time during the property settlement negotiations did his
client, defendant husband, inform him that 23 days prior to
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thc execution of the property settlement agreement, he had
executed a sale deposit receipt for $25,000 for the sale of
Rancho EI Camino, at a price of $525,000, or $814 an acre,
instead of $200 per acre which Mr. Vai had represented to
plaintiff· wife was the book value of the vineyard land at
Rancho EI Camino.
Defendants ·contend, however, that plaintiff is barred by
laches and estoppel. The complaint in the instant action was
not filed until March 18, 1957, although the agreement was
signed by the parties on March 16, 1954. The trial court
found that the plaintiff was told of the sale of Rancho EI
Camino by John and by one of his employees in the "Spring"
of 1954, and consequently is barred by the equitable doctrine
of laches: an unreasonable delay in commencing the action
which bas prejudiced the defendants.
[18] To determine whether the delay has been an un'reasonable one, we are guided by the applicable statute of
limitations for an action at law, in this case, Code of Civil
Procedure section 338, subdivision 4: "An action for relief
on the ground of fraud or mistake [must be commenced within three years]. The cause of action in such case not to be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved
party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake."
[19] There is no evidence in· the record that plaintiff
actually knew of the fraud before the death of her husband.
However, "discovery is different from knowledge, [so] that
where a party defrauded has received information of facts
which Should put him upon inquiry, and the inquiry if made
would disclose the fraud, he will be charged with a discovery
as of the time the inquiry would have given him knowledge."
(Victor Oil Co. v. Drur", 184 Cal. 226, 240 [193 P. 243].)
[a 0 ] "The circumstances must be such that the inquiry becomes a duty, and the failure to make it a negligent omission." (Tarke v. Bifl,g1uz.m, 123 Cal. 163, 166 [55 P. 759].)
"Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make
inquiry, and where under the circumstances 'a prudent
man' would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means
of knowledge are open to a plainti1f, and he has not availed
himself of them, does not debar him from relief when thereafter he shall make actual discovery." (MacDcmald v. Reick
«<: Lievre, I'M., 100 Cal.App. 736, 740-741 [281 P. 106].)
[a 1] Assuming that plaintiff could have discovered the
fraud had she investigated, defendants have not pointed out
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any circumstances which should have put plaintiff upon inquiry until after John's death in 1957 when she was told that
she had not been treated fairly by her husband.
[22] Defendants argue that plaintiff is estopped and
precluded from rescission by the stipulation in the agreement
that it was entered into freely and voluntarily without promises or representations not contained therein, and the trial
court so found. But, as plaintiff correctly points out, when
the agreement itself is procured by fraud, none of its provisions have any legal or binding effect. "This provision of the contract-even if we assume that, if valid, it
could redound to the benefit of the Association-was not a
waiver of plaintiffs' right to maintain the action. The fraud
which was the inducing cause of the execution of the contract
renders the whole instrument vulnerable-the clause in question as well as all the other provisions. (Watson v. Duarte,
62 Cal.App. 52 [215 P. 1039] ; American Natio'lUll Bank v.
Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364 [216 P. 376].) . . . 'No one
can be estopped by anything contained in an instrument which
instrument was itself obtained from him by fraud and deceit.' (Hofflin v. Moss, 67 F. 440, 444 [14 C.C.A. 459].)
The chain cannot be stronger than its weakest link. The
clause which it is claimed estops plaintiff to complain of the
fraud cannot be made to survive the rest of the transaction
as a shield and protection to defendants, when false representations were the efficient and inducing cause of the contract."
(Palladine v. Imperial Valley Farm Lands Assn., 65 Cal.App.
727,747 [225 P. 291].)
It is manifest from the foregoing that plaintiff is neither
estopped nor barred by laches from seeking to rescind the
property settlement agreement, and that she is entitled to
the relief sought because of the constructive fraud of her
husband.
.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Dooling, J., and Fourt, J. pro
tem.,· concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
I would affirm the judgment, for the findings of the trial
court are supported by substantial evidence.
In March 1953 plaintiff and her husband executed a prop* Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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erty settlement agreement dividing their community property.
This agreement was not repudiated until plaintiff brought this
action to rescind it shortly after Mr. Vai's death in 1957. His
will provides that the major part of his property be placed in
trust for the support of his and plaintiff's daughter, who is
mentally arrested, and also for the support of plaintiff should
she be in need and if sufficient assets are available. After the
death of both the daughter and plaintiff the remainder is to go
to certain charities.
The community property of the spouses consisted of real
estate, cash and securities of the value of $1,270,000 and a half
interest in Padre corporation, a family-owned winery. Under
the agreement plaintiff received apartment houses worth
$150,000 and cash in the amount of $27,000. Her husband
agreed to pay all taxes and maintenance costs of the apartment houses for plaintiff's life and guaranteed her a net anllUal income after income taxes of $6,000. In 1953 a commercial annuity equal to these two agreements would have cost
at least $80,000. 1 She will also receive $42,000 and 47%
shares of Bank of America stock pursuant to the agreement to
divide evenly all after-discovered community assets. The total
of these items is over $300,000.
Moreover plaintiff received an automobile, a release from a
$300,000 continuing guaranty executed by her and her husband to secure loans by the Bank of America to the Padre
corporation and a release from a $75,000 guaranty for other
debts. The trial court did not assign a dollar value to these
items. The rest of the community property, and the Padre
stock went to the husband. Plaintiff's husband also agreed,
however, to pay all expenses for the support and care of their
daughter. The trial court determined that the value of the
obligation to provide for this care is between $515,000 and
$615,000.
After deducting for the care of the daughter and the
obligations assumed by Mr. Vai, the division of the community
property was therefore as follows: plaintiff received property
and agreements of the value of over $300,000, an automobile
and a release from liability for the loans of Padre and other
community debts. The husband received property of the
value of approximately $350,000 to $450,000 and the Padre
stock.
1This figure is based on an interpretation of the agreement least favorable to plnintiff. Under other interpretations it would be far greater.
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This agreement was reached after negotiations in which
the plaintiff was at all times represented by counsel of her
own choice, and her counsel drafted the agreement.
Plaintiff contends that she and her attorney were induced
to propose this agreement by misrepresentations of the value
.. of some of the community assets and by the concealment of
material facts regarding an offer to purchase EI Camino
Ranch, a 6oo-acre vineyard.
The trial court found that the agreement was fair and
equitable, that there were no intentional misrepresentations,
and that the concealment of the offer for the purchase of EI
Camino Ranch was not relied upon by plaintiff. In plaintiff's
view these findings are not supported by the evidence.
She contends that the evidence clearly proves that she did
not receive half the community property and that therefore
the agreement was not fair and equitable. There was otl;.er
evidence, however, from which the court could infer that
the agreement was fair and equitable.
The community property consisted in large part of vineyards and other investments in the wine industry. There was
evidence that the wine industry was depressed at the time
of the agreement. 2 Padre, the family corporation in which
the community held a half interest, incurred losses of $955,000
during the five years preceding the negotiations. During the
fiscal years 1951 and 1952, the two years prior to the negotiations, Padre's losses were $339,494.40 and $196,746.75 respectively. Although its book value was $800,000, the corporation was torn by internal strife between the Vai brothers
and was losing money at an alarming rate. There was also
evidence that the community lemon orchards and vineyards
were all operating at a loss. Moreover, some of the community securities were pledged for loans from the Bank of
America.
Under the agreement plaintiff received all of the properties
that interested her and that she asked for. She was relieved
of any liability for the debts of the losing business enterprises
and obtained many of the stable community assets. Mr. Vai
received the home, which plaintiff disliked, that he and his
daughter were occupying, the community securities, a lodge,
"Wine was selling for $0.35 a gallon at the time of the property agree·
ment. Plaintiff's witness, a wine broker. testilied that "normally the
price is eonsiderably higher ... [t)oday the same wines are worth $0.75
a gallon" and in 1950 the price of the same wines was as high as $0.95
a gallon.
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and the assets of speculative value. Plaintiff's agreement appeared advantageous given the possibility that Padre, the
vineyards and the citrus groves would continue to operate
.. nt a loss as in the preceding five years.
Plaintiff and her attorney were aware of this possibility.
Her attorney advised her several times to demand some of the
vineyards, but she refused to have anything to do with thosc
"money losing vineyards." What she wanted was the property that would provide for her security. Her attorney testified: "I went over the list of assets and valuations with her.
She expressed to me the thought that what she wanted more
than anything was security. I talked with her about the Alta
Loma property and she told me that she didn't want Alta
Loma, that John was happy there, and apparently the daughter, Madelinl', was happy there, and that she didn't want ally
part of it. The same was true of Arrowhead.
"We discussed valuations somewhat in connection with the
600 acres [EI Camino Ranch]. She didn't express either assent or disapproval of the $200 per acre figure that I had
brought back to her she wanted the Parkside property and
she wanted security.
, , We then discussed what would give her that security and
what she might expect out of it and I believe at that time we
discussed taking the Parkside property together with the
furniture and furnishings, a cash lump settlement payment,
and support money for a period of limited years.
"It is my recollection t.hat at that time we discussed the
sum of $25,000 as being a cash payment in addition to the
Parkside property plus $5,000 per year for five years, together with the payment of her expenses to date, and the
Dodge automobile. In addition, it was still understood that
Mr. Vai would be required to support the daughter." At
another point plaintiff's attorney testified:
"A. Let me put it this way; there were certain assets which
she could take that she didn't have to gamble on as to thl'ir
future worth.
"Q. Those were the assets that you managed to get for her f
A. That's correct. . ..
"Q. At the time that you visited Mrs. Vai to sign thl' agrel'ment you were well aware of the fact were you not, that Mr.
Vai was going to get the majority of the assets. A. DoBal'
wise on the valuation that had lx'en placed on them, yes."
In evaluating the fairness of the agreement, the court could
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eonsider that at the time of the settlement plaintiff and Mr.
Vai were 66 and 71 years old, respectively, that they had a
common heir, their daughter, and that plaintiff was willing
to accept less than half the community property if she wel'(,
given the stable rather than the speculative assets.
The finding that there was no intentional misrepresentation
is supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Bodkin, decedent's
attorney who was present during all of the negotiations, testified that no representations were made as to the value of
Padre. There is evidence that plaintiff's attorney had a current statement of Padre's position and it is admitted that he
had a 1950 Dun & Bradstreet report fixing the value of Padre
at over $1,000,000. Plaintiff and her attorney were told that
the Padre Company was heavily indebted, had been losing
money for years, that substantially all the company's assets
were "in hock," that the company owed money to the Vai
brothers for back salary and that the company was in danger
of insolvency. The trial court found that these representations were true. This finding is supported by evidence that
Padre owed the Bank of America $480,000, that Padre lost
over $950,000 during the last five years, that the wine industry
was seriously depressed, that in 1952 payments of salary to
John Vai and his brother had been reduced from $3,000 a
month to $200 a month at the "suggestion" of the Bank of
America, Padre's principal creditor, that at the time of the
property agreement the salary payments to the Vai brothers
were only $500 a month, that the cashier of Padre had written
cheeks for over $40,000 but was unable to release them to the
payees because of lack of funds, and by the testimony of a
Bank of America official that substantially all the assets of
Padre were "in hock."
Plaintiff contends that the evidence is undisputed that during the negotiations Mr. Vai received an offer to purchase
EI Camino Ranch for $575,000 and that this offer was intentionally not communicated to plaintiff. The trial court
found that decedent received such an offer and did not communicate it to plaintiff. The court also found, however, that
there was no intentional concealment of the offer. This finding is supported by the evidence. Mr. Bodkin testified that
he had no knowledge of the offer, and the court could infer,
as it did, that Mr. Vai was not aware of his duty to reveal this
offer.
Plaintiff contends, however, that even if there were no in-
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tentional misrepresentations of the value of the community
property alld no intentional concealment of the offer to purchase EI Camino Ranch, the decedent was nevertheless guilty
of constructive fraud since he owed a fiduciary duty to his
wife as to the community property under his control and was
therefore under a duty to state the correct value of all the
community property and to reveal the offer to purchase EI
Camino Ranch. Plaintiff contends that the husband is a
trustee for the wife as to the community property and that
he must reveal to the wife the true value of all the property
and correct any misapprehensions that she or her attorney
may have.
The fiduciary relationship arising from our community
property system is not that of a trustee and beneficiary of
an express trust. A trustee has no interest in the assets of
the trust and may not assume a position in conflict with the
interest of the beneficiaries. Each spouse, however, has a
half interest in the community property and upon division
of such property the spouses are in a position adverse to each
other. Moreover, the liability of a husband for management and
spending of community assets is markedly dissimilar to those
of a trustee of an express trust. (See Civ. Code, § 172.)
The fiduciary relationship between spouses arises from the
confidential relationship between them and from the control
that one spouse exercises over the community property. When
a confidential relationship exists the spouses are held to a very
high degree of fiduciary duty (Burrows v. Burrows, 136 Cal.
App. 323, 327, 329 [28 P.2d 1072]) and no spouse will be permitted to gain any advantage from the trust and confidence
placed in him or her by the other. Even when the confidential
relationship is destroyed by dispute between the spouses, as
the court found was the case between plaintiff and Mr. Vai,
the spouse controlling the community property still owes a
fiduciary duty to the other spouse. This duty, however, is
analogous to the duty, not of a trustee to a beneficiary. but of
one partner to another during the dissolution of a part Ilership.
(Cf. Lynam v. Vorwerk, 13 Cal.App. 507, 509 [110 P. 355].)
The fiduciary relationship of partners extends to the dis.rolution of the partnership (Page v. Page, 55 Cal.2d 192,
194 [10 Cal Rptr. 643, 359 P.2d 41) ; Laux v. Freed, 53 Cal.
2<1 512, 522 [348 P.2d 873]). Partners negotiating for the
division of the partn(>rship assets may nevertheless tak(> positions consistent with their own int(>rest and in conflict with
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those of the copartners. A partner is under a duty, however,
to make all the facts available to any copartner and to disclose
all facts peculiarly within his own knowledge. (Arnold v.
AnlOld, 137 Cal. 291, 296 [70 P. 23] ; Reed v. Wood, 190 Okla.
169 [123 P.2d 275, 278] ; Law v. Law [1905], 1 Ch. 140, 157;
see Co.lton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351,372,380,388 [23 P. 16, 16
Am.St.Rep. 137] ; Crane, Partnerships, 360; Story, Partnerships, 303; 120 A.L.R. 724, 737.) "As to the confidential
relation of partners, the general rule is, that it exists only as
to the current business of the partnership, and that when
they come to contract with each other for a dissolution of
the partnership they stand at arm's length. It may be conceded that this rule is subject to the qualification that in
negotiations for a dissolution each partner must deal fairly
with his copartners, and not conceal from them important
matters within his own knowledge touching the business and
property of the partnership." (Arnold v. Arnold, supra, at
p. 296; accord: Arnold v. Maxwell, 223 Mass. 47 [111 N.E.
687, 689-690].)
Likewise in negotiations for a property settlement agreement, each spouse may take a position that favors his or her
interest and is opposed to the interest of the other spouse.
The duty owed between spouses in negotiating property settlement agreements has been frequently defined by this court
and the District Courts of Appeal. (Collins v. Colli11S, 48
Ca1.2d 325, 331 [309 P.2d 420] ; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32
Cal.2d 13, 22 [193 P.2d 728] ; Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133,
144 [204 P. 583] ; Hellsley v. Hensley, 179 Cal. 284, 287 [183
P. 445] ; Champion Y. Woods, 79 Cal. 17, 20-21 [21 P. 534,
12 Am.St.Rep. 126]; Estate of BUzZy, 169 Cal.App.2d 479,
491-492 [337 P.2d 511] (hearing denied); Cameron v.
Cameron, 88 Cal.App.2d 585, 593-597 [199 P.2d 443] (hearing
denied) ; Miga1a v. Dakin, 99 Cal.App. 60, 64 [277 P. 898]
(hearing denied); Chadwick v. Chadwick, 95 Cal.App. 690,
700-701 [273 P. 86]; see 1 Armstrong, California Family
Law, 574, 576; Black, Rescission and Cancellation, § 54.)
In each of these cases the court held that, after the destruction of the confidential relationship, spouses negotiatin~ a
property settlement agreement deal with each other at I t arm's
length," with the exception stated in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen
that each spouse must reveal information peculiarly within
his or her own knowledge such as the existence of community
property.

July 1961]

VAlVo BANK OF AMERICA
[56 C.2d 329; 15 CaI.Rptr. '11. 364 P.2d 247)

)

351

The Collins decision is not based solely upon waiver by the
wife of the fiduciary duty of the husband. It recognizes that
after the destruction of the confidential relationship between
wife and husband the spouses may take positions consistent
with their oWn interest, unlike the trustee, who has no interest
in the property that he is administering. We stated in Collins
that "when the parties to a marriage are negotiating a property settlement agreement with recognition that their interests
are adverse and are dealing at arm's length, neither spouse
owes to the other the duty of disclosure which he or she would
owe if their relation remained in fact a confidential one."
( Collins v. CoUins, 48 Cal.2d 325, 331 [309 P .2d 420].) Likewise in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen we stated that although a
spouse must reveal facts peculiarly within the spouse's knowledge, such as the existence of property, "[a] husband at the
time of divorce or separation is entitled to take a position
favorable to his own interest in claiming as his separate propertyassets that a court might hold to be community property.
Confronted with the assertion by the husband that certain
assets are his separate property the wife must take her own
position and if necessary investigate the facts. " (Jorgensen
v. Jorgensen, supra, at p. 22; see also Black, Rescission and
Cancellation, § 54.) When a spouse is given full access to
the information necessary to negotiate a property agreement,
an error of judgment by the spouse or her attorney is not
ground for rescission. (Cameron v. Cameron, supra, 88 Cal.
App.2d 585, 595.)
In the present case the trial court's finding that plaintiff
had access to all of the information except the offer to purchase the El Camino Ranch is supported by the testimony of
both plaintiff's attorney and decedent's attorney. Plaintiff's
attorney made substantial investigations of his own. He testified that he had reports from Dun & Bradstreet stating that
the net worth of Padre as of 1950 was $1,107,000; he also had
a Dun & Bradstreet report on Mr. Vai individually; he had
reports from a private detective and from a title company;
he had the property he was primarily interested in (Parkside
Apartments) appraised; he suspended investigation only after
he had obtained such information as he thought necessary.
Mr. Bodkin testified that plaintiff's former attorney received
a current statement of the position of Padre and was urged
to make appraisals of all the property. He was also given a
list of assets that except for some inadvertent omissions listed
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all of the community assets. Moreover, all books were open to ,
his inspection. Plaintiff was therefore neither actually nor
constructively defrauded as to the value of the community
property.
There was a duty, however, to disclose the offer to purchase
the EI Camino Ranch. This offer was peculiarly within de- '
cedent's own knowledge and the failure to disclose it was a
breach of duty. (Jorgensen v. Jorge,nsC11, supra, 32 Ca1.2d
13, 21; see Arnold v. Arnold, supra, 137 Cal. 291, 296; Ree(l
v. Wood, supra, 190 Okla. 169 [123 P.2d 275, 278] ; Law v.
Law, supra [1905], 1 Ch. 140, 157; Cran£', Partnerships, 360;
Story, Partnerships, 303; cf. Civ. Code, § 1573.) If the lack
of knowledge of the offer affected the dealings of the parties,
plaintiff would be entitled to rescission or in the court's discretion to damages resulting from the failure to disclose the
offer. (See Arnold v. Maxwell, supra, 223 Mass. 47 [111 N.E.
687,690]; Turner v. Otis, 30 Kan. 1 [1 P. 19, 21] ; 5 Williston,
Contracts, 4192-4193.)
The court found, however, that plaintiff failed to prove
that she would not have entered into the agreement had she
known of the offer. Under such circumstances a contract cannot be rescinded. (Colton v. Stanford, supra, 82 Cal. 351,
399; Oppenheimer v. Clunie, 142 Cal. 313, 318-319 [75 P.
899] ; Greenawalt v. Rogers, 151 Cal. 630, 635 [91 P. 526].)
Likewise, damages will be denied to a plaintiff who fails to
prove that he relied on the misrepresentation. (Hobart v.
Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 422, 444-447 [159 P.2d
958] ; cf. Civ. Code, § 1568.)
Reliance is an essential element not only of intentional fraud
but of constructive fraud arising from a breach of fiduciary
or other duty. (Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra [breach
of duty by officer of a corporation owing fiduciary duty to
stockholder] ; Colton v. Stanford, supra, 82 Cal. 351, 399-401
[dealings between business associates owing fiduciary duties
to each other] ; Hensley v. Hensley, supra, 179 Cal. 284, 287
[property settlement agreement]; Verdier v. Verdier, 133
Cal.App.2d 325, 328 [284 P.2d 94] [property settlement agreement] ; Pinney &- Topliff v. Chrysler Corp., 176 F.Supp. 801,
803.)
In Hobart v. Hoba1·t Estate Co. we reversed a judgment for
damages for fraud by a fiduciary because the issue of justifiable reliance was taken from the jury by erroneous instructions of the trial court. Likewise in cases identical with the
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present ease, this court and the district courts of appeal have
held that proof of reliance on the alleged misrepresentation
of a spouse is necessary to rescind a property settlement agreement. (Hensley v. Hensley, supra, 179 Cal. 284, 287; Verdier v. Verdier, 133 Cal.App.2d 325, 328-329 [284 P.2d 94].)
When an inadvertent omission to disclose facts that there is a
duty to disclose or an erroneous statement by a fiduciary does
not influence plaintiff's conduct, rescission of a settlement
agreement is properly denied. (Civ. Code, §§ 1689, 1567 and
1568; 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, p. 603; Prosser,
Torts, § 89; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 890; Fleming,
Torts, pp. 656-657; Rest., Contracts, §§ 471c, 476b, 476c; Rest.,
Restitution, § 9b.)
The court's finding that plaintiff would have entered into
the contract even had she been informed of the offer to purchase the El Camino Ranch is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's former attorney when asked if, at the time
he made the property settlement offer, he had sufficient in-·
formation upon which to base such offer, testified: "Well, I
felt that I had sufficient information at that time to enable me
to negotiate a settlement that would be satisfactory to my
client without further investigation as to the value of the San
Bernardino County property. I thought that perhaps the
valuations placed on the land by Mr. Vai might be low in some
instances, but on the other hand, Mrs. Vai at that time had
expressed to me a desire that she did not want to participate
in the Arrowhead, the Alta Loma, or the EI Camino properties
and therefore under the circumstances I felt that the assets
and the support which she might acquire under the terms of
the letter of the 9th would possibly be beneficial to her."
The attorney further testified that he realized that EI
Camino Ranch "had a potential future value in excess of
anything that we had discussed," that he advised plaintiff in
attempt to secure a part of the vineyard lands in San Bernardino County, but that she indicated that she did not want any
interest in the vineyards, but wanted other assets to compensate for them.
From the foregoing testimony the court could infer that
plaintiff would have entered into the agreement even had she
known of the offer for EI Camino Ranch. This inference is
particularly rcasonable since the offer to purchase EI Camino
Ranch provided for only a small down payment and a large
purchase-moncy trust deed to secure the remainder of the pur56 C.2d-I2
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chasc price. Such a transaction entailed a considerable risk
that the price of the land would not be paid if the vineyards
continued to be unprofitable. The testimony of plaintiff's
attorney indicated that plaintiff was not interested in taking
. such risks and that she wanted the stable community property
assets even at the expense of securing considerably less than
. half the community property. Moreover, the offer to purchase
the ranch was for the fair market value of the property. Such
offer therefore neither enlarged nor diminished the value of
the community property.
Plaintiff contends that even if she is not entitled to relief
under the ordinary rules regulating property settlement agreements between spouses her husband nevertheless assumed
special duties toward her. Previous to the property settlement agreement plaintiff attempted to take her husband's
deposition. Mr. Vai, however, was ill and unable to give the
lleposition. His attorney therefore suggested that the deposi1 ion be postponed and promised to supply all information requested by plaintiff.
The evidence supports the trial court's finding that Mr. Vai
was ill at the time the deposition was to be taken and that he
supplied all the information requested. There was no further
request for a deposition. Plaintiff's attorney indicated that
he had obtaUied all the information he required. The promise
to supply all the information requested without formal depositions did not place decedent in any special position of trust.
Moreover, the trial court found that plaintiff did not in fact
place confidence in her husband but independently investigated the facts in which she was interested.
Schauer, J., concurred.
R.espondents' petition for a rehearing was denied August
23, 1961. Fourt, J. pro tem.,· participated in place of McComb, J., who deemed himself disqualified. Traynor, J., and
Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.

*AB8igned by Chairman of Judicial COUIlCil.

